I wrote about how the deluge of loan extensions being offered to subprime borrowers was going to leave some of them in the position of needing more than a year to pay back accrued interest before their principal balance would decrease again.

High extension rates at the onset of the pandemic alarmed investors, but I took a closer look at payment rates in this blog post and theorized that many borrowers were accepting extensions not because they couldn't make their payments, but because servicers were proactively offering them and the borrowers were opting for the flexibility.

I wrote about a counterintuitive phenomenon revealed within the auto loan data: 2 borrower loans had higher default rates than single borrower loans because lenders usually report the higher of the two FICO scores.

I showed how investors can use mortgage servicing data to preview delinquency rates across pools backing their Government Sponsored Entity risk-sharing investments a full month in advance.

The most important piece I published at KBRA. I refuted a myth within the mortgage industry that loosely underwritten mortgages from the early 2000's proved high default rates were not inevitable for less creditworthy borrowers. I showed that the macroeconomic environment of the time artificially suppressed defaults by shifting those borrowers into new mortgages during subsequent rate and cash-out refinance waves.

When Freddie Mac released automated valuation data for every loan in their risk share portfolio, I wrote about how I thought investors and modelers could best take advantage of the data.

I wrote about the best ways investors could use the updated credit score data now being provided by the GSEs to predict default risk.